Name - Rick Snyden
Age - 29
Hometown - Villagefield Townsburg
High School Attended - Villagefield Townsburg High School
Birthday - February 30th
Occupation - US Cryptologist / Radio Operator USS Yorktown

For the last 7 years I have been working as a radio cryptologist in the army, I have never seen action like I am now in my service. The Yorktown is taking the brunt of the damage as we combat the Japanese empire, first we were crippled after the Battle of the Coral Sea. Then we were rushed through a 3 month repair in 72 hours so we could make it into Midway. In Midway, we took a lot of damage again. The Japanese are always surprised at the presence of the Yorktown, which they seem to think they have sunk if I have been breaking their code correctly, which I would like to think that I have. At one point, our repair crews worked fast enough to make them think that we were an entirely new carrier during Midway. The whole key to winning at Midway was our efforts, the Cryptologists. I don't want to sound like I'm bragging, but we were able to crack the Japanese code shortly after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the engagement we were in before Midway. Yamamoto was, quite frankly, a master tactician, and had a tendency to over-plan. He brought a total of 8 task forces, with roughly 3 heavy carriers, 4 light carriers, and a plethora of other ships. However, he made too many assumptions on less than accurate intelligence. He believed that the Yorktown was sunk during the Battle of the Coral Sea, where it was only heavily damaged. He also believed that the USS Enterprise and USS Hornet would not be able to be in the battle of midway, allowing an opening for his forces. However, his massive task force was drained when the Japanese attempted an offensive against the Aleutian Islands, drawing 2 of his 8 task forces, some ships that could have made a difference in the battle. While he laid out all of his plans to the other captains of the fleet, the Japanese were slow developing a new code, allowing us to gain some very valuable intelligence.

All of this intelligence was relayed to Admiral Chester Nimitz. He rushed to put together a fleet capable of meeting the Japanese armada, rushing the Yorktown through a projected 3 - 4 month repair in 72 hours, and bringing together other ships that wouldn't have engaged otherwise. Knowing of the Japanese plan to create a diversion at the Aleutian Islands, the 2 task forces heading there were mostly ignored, allowing the US fleet to concentrate on the encroaching Japanese fleets. On June 3, 1942, our reconnaissance planes sighted the Japanese fleet of roughly 185 ships all heading at Midway. After several waves of bombers back and forth between the Japanese fleet and bombers stationed on Midway causing little overall damage, the US launched a total of 36 carrier-launched dive bombers after the "Call and response" of bombing runs. The dive bombers caught the Japanese completely by surprise, as they attempted to launch another wing of fighters off of their carriers. 3 of the 4 Japanese carriers were heavily damaged, then sunk, with the fourth sunk after it inflicted heavy damage on the Yorktown, again. Even though the Japanese brought a fleet of 185 ships, the carriers were the heart of the fleets. Without the carriers, the Japanese effort never would have happened. During battle, the Japanese lost all four of the Carriers it brought, as well as two cruisers and three destroyers. What really hurt them, in my opinion, was the lost of so many of their fighter pilots. They lost around double ours, 330. Midway helped us stop the Japanese pushing further into the pacific, and possibly giving them the opportunity to set their sights on Hawaii. If we lost at Midway, I shudder to think what would have happened to the United States in the pacific theater.


Works Cited

Willbanks, James H. "Battle of Midway." In Tucker, Spencer C., gen. ed. Encyclopedia of American Military History. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2003. American History Online. Facts On File, Inc. <http://www.fofweb.com/activelink2.asp?ItemID=WE52&iPin=EMHII0271&SingleRecord=True> accessed October 24, 2007 HCRHS.